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Abstract: This article examines the relationship between the Communist Party of Great 
Britain and Irish communists in both Ireland and Britain in the post-war era. It argues that the 
British party’s strategic interest in Ireland gradually waned as it became apparent that Irish 
communism would remain divided by the border. The article also argues how, in Britain, 
competition between the nationalist Anti-Partition League and the communist dominated 
Connolly Association led the latter to abandon Cold War sectarianism and to adopt a ‘broad 
strategy’ championing civil rights in Northern Ireland. The article draws out the key role 
played by Charles Desmond Greaves in this process, whilst noting the importance of 
factionalism and external factors, notably the Irish Republican Army’s Border Campaign. 










Prior to 1945, the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) had an important influence over 
the direction of communist organisation and policy in Ireland. In line with Comintern 
directives, British communists played a key role in the ‘Bolshevisation’ of the Communist 
Party of Ireland (CPI) during the 1920s, and the subsequent dissolution of the party in southern 
Ireland in 1941, despite local communist opposition (Milotte, 1984, p. 191; O’Connor, 2004, 
p. 231). The latter occurred against the backdrop of continuing southern Irish neutrality 
following Germany’s invasion of the USSR, when ‘London knew the Comintern wanted 
unqualified commitment to the war effort’ (O’Connor, 2004, p. 231). However, because of 
Northern Ireland’s participation in the war, no similar northern dissolution took place. Rather, 
the relative popularity of the CPGB in wartime Britain was one factor in the rapid growth of 
communism in Belfast, and until the end of 1946, CPGB leaders regularly spoke on public 
platforms to assist in building up support for the local Communist Party (CP).1 In southern 
Ireland, the post-war consolidation of communism did not lead to the re-establishment of the 
CPI; rather the unwillingness of cadres to identify as communist, mainly because of fears of 
clerical attack and government censure, meant a new party emerged in the guise of the Irish 
Workers’ League (IWL) (Smylie, 2010, pp. 71-73). This meant the CPGB had to re-configure 
how it would conduct relations with two partitioned Irish communist parties. This was further 
complicated by the existence, in Britain, of the Connolly Association (CA), an organisation of 
Irish emigrants dominated by communists. 
The Irish communist 'movement', therefore, was characterised by the overlapping and 
occasionally fractious relationships between nominally autonomous groupings: the CPGB, the 
Irish communist parties, and the CA. Scholars of the CPGB have noted the long-term 
involvement of Irish people in British communism and how the ‘freedom of movement 
between the countries remained a possible factor in the making of Irish communists’ (Morgan, 
Cohen & Flinn, 2007, p. 199). Nevertheless, there is no dedicated study of the relations between 
British and Irish parties in the post-war period. The most relevant historiography has indicated 
how this network influenced the development of the Northern Ireland civil rights movement in 
the 1960s, but it underestimates the complex dynamic of the process, and instead largely 
focuses on one individual, C.D. Greaves, the CPGB’s ‘Irish expert’ and the leading figure in 
the CA. One authority also notes that opposition to Greaves existed in British and Irish 
communist circles, but this is discussed in passing and Greaves’ own assessment of its cause, 
effect and resolution is uncritically accepted (Prince, 2007). 
This article firstly examines the characteristics of the relationship between the CPGB 
and Irish communists from the war’s end to 1956, arguing that frustration with perceived 
Irish obfuscation lessened the CPGB leadership’s direct involvement in Irish affairs. The next 
section examines the dynamic of Irish emigrant politics during the same period, arguing that 
competition between the CA and the Anti-Partition League led to a realignment in the 
Association’s strategy which, guided by the CPGB, increasingly entailed adopting a broader 
populist platform, emphasising nationalism over socialism. The article then examines how 
Greaves came to dominate the direction of the Connolly Association against the backdrop of 
the IRA’s ‘border campaign’ in the late fifties and early sixties. Finally, it considers how, 
having finally defeated opposition from within the ‘movement’, the Connolly Association’s 
emerging prominence led to a concentrated focus on Northern Ireland, and the genesis of a 
civil rights strategy. 
Fraternal and frustrated: the CPGB and Irish Communism, 1945-56
What were the main characteristics of the relationship between the Irish parties and the CPGB?  
Firstly, the massive disparity in terms of membership and resources left it an unequal one from 
the outset.  In Irish affairs, the CPGB provided political, organisational and ideological support, 
expertise and encouragement, occasionally to the point of dictating a line. Industrial affairs 
represented a shared sphere of activity, due to the presence of British trade unions in Ireland. 
Indeed, CPGB figures briefed their Irish counterparts on the British trade union movement, 
while Irish communists reciprocated on Irish affairs.2  Information concerning industrial 
matters, and much else, of interest to rank and file members was facilitated by the availability 
of the CPGB press in Ireland. Moreover, when Irish printers refused to work on the IWL’s 
paper due to clerical pressure, the CPGB found a printer for the Irish Worker’s Voice in 
England.3  The Irish parties certainly took inspiration from CPGB activity, for instance, when 
following the British lead, the CP took up a campaign on behalf of squatters immediately 
following the war.  The British Party also acted as a theoretical resource for Irish Communists. 
Irish cadres often used CPGB literature for educational classes, while the Young Communist 
League in Belfast based its constitution on the CPGB’s youth organisation.4 The sharing of 
expertise extended on one occasion to Irish communist leaders attending the congress of the 
CPGB’s Scottish division to learn about ‘organisation’.5 Above all, visits to Ireland by leading 
CPGB figures represented the most visible and significant aspect of the post-war relationship.
 In August 1952, for example, Sam Aaronovitch, the CPGB’s ‘Cultural Commissar’, 
visited Dublin for five days to oversee an IWL ‘Educational School’, which subsequently 
influenced IWL propaganda on the cultural Cold War.6 In fact, Irish Communists generally 
held the CPGB in high regard, welcoming British ‘advisers’ and displaying little of the typical 
nationalist antipathy towards British interference or high-handedness. During the war the CP’s 
propaganda occasionally referred to its General Secretary, William McCullough, as the ‘Pollitt 
of the North’.  In essence, the CPGB constituted the main link between Irish communism and 
the international movement, while the CPGB typically viewed itself as the guarantor of correct 
thinking and activity in Ireland, a view that Irish comrades apparently endorsed. However, 
during the 1950s the CPGB’s relationship with the Irish parties would suffer from factionalism, 
perceived failures in relation to the international line, and the generally unfavourable conditions 
for communist advance in Ireland.
A report on the proceedings of a CP congress, in July 1950, written by the leading 
British communist Phil Piratin, demonstrates the nature of the relationship and highlights 
British priorities. Before leaving Britain to attend the Congress, Piratin met with fellow CPGB 
stalwarts Bob Stewart, and Peter Kerrigan. They agreed:  
that we do not of our own accord intervene in the organisation or political approach; that we try by 
suggestion to get them to change the character of the discussion from that anticipated from the long and 
detailed Congress Discussion Statement; that instead, the discussion be restricted to the main problems, 
i.e. Peace, the Economic Position, and the Unity of Ireland.7 
Dissatisfied with apparent prevarication and failure to concentrate on specific objectives, the 
CPGB dispatched Piratin to focus Irish minds. In reality, an outbreak of internal CP 
factionalism and Piratin’s dissatisfaction that ‘nothing had been done’ in relation to ‘Peace’ 
meant that the congress did not even discuss the ‘Unity of Ireland’.8 
Contemporaneous CPGB thinking explains why ‘Peace’ was an imperative of these 
emissaries.  R. Palme Dutt, the CPGB leader most associated with following the Kremlin line, 
provided ‘the framework within which the particular crises and conflicts of Britain and the 
British Empire-Commonwealth were understood by Communists in the 1950s’ (Callaghan, 
2003, p. 123).   Dutt believed that the British Empire survived because it helped Britain to 
facilitate US imperialism. This ‘subordinating alliance… threatened to precipitate a third world 
war, and thus the anti-colonial campaign was linked with the most important single subject of 
Communist agitation during the 1950s: support for Soviet ‘Peace’ initiatives and opposition to 
Anglo-American “warmongering”’ (Howe, 1993, p. 187). It was also the lens through which 
the CPGB viewed Ireland. In November 1950, a document drawn up for the party’s 
International Department discussed developments in southern Ireland since the defeat, in 
February 1948, of the Fianna Fáil administration: 
The De Valera Government failed to win an overall majority because it had failed to solve the long 
outstanding problems of the Irish people, and had instead entered on the path of retreat, by acceptance of 
the Marshall plan, and its associated schemes of making Ireland’s economy subservient to the needs of 
imperialism, in particular the preparation for war.9
Moreover, southern workers refusal to enter into the war alliance without the ending of 
partition had left the new coalition government with no options other than ‘virtual acceptance 
of a “dominion” or tutelary status’. The key to the coalition government’s ‘capitulationist 
policy’ (sic) was ‘the weakness of Irish capitalism in relation to Britain and America’.10  This 
had domestic and international ramifications for the CPGB.  In Ireland, there was ‘the need for 
a national-liberation struggle north and south, against British imperialism’, whilst in Britain: 
the large numbers of exiles in Britain and their close contact with Irish affairs creates 
the necessity of our approaching them specially (sic) on the basis of the struggle for 
Irish national unity and independence. The need (sic) for an Irish national movement in 
Britain, led by us.11  
The challenge was to transform Irish communism into a cohesive movement with a unified 
political programme as a focal point for a broader coalition of ‘progressive’ forces. This would 
also foster greater cohesion amongst Irish emigrants in Britain, notably amongst members of 
the CPGB and the CA, thereby making communism more attractive to the Irish in Britain. In 
addition, it might also strengthen CPGB opposition to the robustly anti-communist Association 
of Catholic Trade Unionists, a particular concern of Harry Pollitt, CPGB General Secretary.12 
The CPGB, therefore, adopted an anti-partitionist stance in some constituencies during its 
‘pragmatic and opportunistic’ general election campaign in 1950 (Jackson, 1963, p. 127). 
 However, the formulation of a unified programme proved elusive for reasons the CPGB 
well understood, chief among them partition. Throughout the early 1950s, International 
Department reports contained widespread all-Ireland social and economic analyses, 
highlighting obstacles posed by: economic unsoundness and entrenched vested interests north 
and south; British imperialism’s historical role in creating these conditions and Anglo-US 
imperialism’s role in their preservation; the organisational duality of trade unions and labour 
and communist movements arising from partition; and the disunity of ‘progressive’ forces. A 
1953 report stated that in the north, ‘it has not been easy to formulate a policy which would 
unite Protestant and Catholic, town and country, apart from purely economic issues which are 
insufficient’.  In the south, ‘the great problem before the Workers’ League is how to break 
through its isolation in the face of the continuous attacks of clerical reaction’.13
This led the CPGB to encourage a Joint Council of the CP and IWL in November 1952. 
Yet, ‘differences’ at the Council’s inaugural meeting obliged the CPGB to despatch a unifying 
envoy, R. Palme Dutt, to the second, in February 1953. Dutt reported that he attended in a 
‘consultative capacity and not to lay down a particular political line’.14 Perhaps aware of the 
effects of his own formidable reputation, the leading British ‘Stalinist’ also noted that 
‘everyone was on their best behaviour’ and that the ‘so-called differences had been less than 
alleged’.  However, he did encounter ‘some tendency for comrades from the South and a 
minority from Belfast, to press for a stronger line in opposition to partition… and for other 
representatives from Belfast to emphasise the dangers of isolation from the mass of the 
Protestant workers from Belfast by appearing to make the issue of partition a central political 
issue’. Nonetheless, Dutt suggested that Irish communists generally appreciated ‘the approach 
to the aim of national independence of a united Ireland required the strengthening of the 
working class and democratic movement and the fight for peace on both sides, and the 
development of co-operation’.15 Dutt’s nominally consultative role reflected an already 
established CPGB policy and his focus on ‘peace’, the ‘democratic movement’ and ‘national 
independence’ merely reinforced previous emphasis on these fundamental concerns. 
 Nevertheless, leading CPGB figures gradually became impatient at the Irish comrades’ 
inability to agree a programme of action for the whole of Ireland. In 1956, Idris Cox of the 
International Committee noted how a commission of Irish communists, from North and South 
had met the CPGB’s National Executive ‘three years ago’ (1953), with a draft all-Ireland 
programme.16 This had taken two years after which time leading CPGB figures had met to 
‘make a number of proposals for its improvement’. However, the issue had dropped off the 
radar ‘for over a year’ as the Irish parties did not respond to the CPGB proposals.17 Cox 
believed the absence of such a programme was a ‘serious impediment to the political activity 
of our Irish comrades in Britain’. His logic rested on the grounds that:
While our main emphasis is on their mass activity in relation to their common problems with Irish 
workers it would obviously be an advantage if [this] was related to what could be done to achieve Irish 
unity and to give solidarity and support to a united movement in Ireland of democratic advance and 
socialism.18
The IWL/CP ‘commission’ or Joint Council made up of leading IWL and CP members had 
clearly disappointed expectations in London. As a result, Cox pondered whether the CPGB 
should attempt to provide a lead in Ireland: 
I know that we hesitate to intervene directly in these matters, but it seems to me that the time has come 
when we should take this matter up again. I don’t suggest the Executive Committee adopting any 
resolution on the matter but rather that yourself and John Gollan should have a personal talk with the 
Irish comrades this coming weekend and emphasise the urgency of speeding up their discussions on this 
programme so that more effective political aid can be given in the course of our activity in Britain.19
Apparently, Cox believed that the CPGB’s Executive Committee could pass resolutions on 
Ireland, which the Irish would then implement. Moreover, this clearly served CPGB interests 
as much as Irish. Nonetheless, in spite of apparent frustration, Cox still preferred an Irish lead 
over dictation, as his own letters demonstrate that CPGB interest in Ireland at leadership level 
was intermittent. 
The late 1950s witnessed a further decline in the CPGB leadership’s interest in Irish 
affairs. Indeed, Irish communists complained about diminishing British support.  In February 
1959, CP General Secretary, Billy McCullough, wrote to John Gollan, General Secretary of 
the CPGB, to inform him ‘that we have run into an extremely serious crisis in the Party here’.20 
The CP had been forced to vacate its headquarters of twenty years due to financial difficulties, 
whilst ‘landlord opposition’ might soon leave the party ‘literally… on the streets’. This, 
McCullough feared, would have ‘adverse effects on organisation’. He went on to state: 
Years ago, many years ago, it had been the practice for our brother Party in Britain to pay some attention 
to affairs here, and on many occasions we have had the assistance and advice for periods of time of 
experienced British comrades.
Unfortunately, except for very occasional visits, about once per year for educational purposes, we have 
been politically isolated from Britain…But I consider the present crisis in our Party to be of such a serious 
nature that I am urgently suggesting that you send over to Belfast as quickly as possible a leading British 
comrade…21         
Gollan read this letter to the CPGB’s Political Committee, which proposed a figure visit by a 
British figure.22 
Nevertheless, CPGB interest in Irish communist affairs had clearly receded during the 
post-war years. Even the ‘fundamental question’ of a united programme had been allowed onto 
the back-burner in the mid-1950s. British disinterest may have encouraged the very 
procrastination in Ireland, which Cox so readily criticised. Yet, a more fundamental reason for 
the malaise appeared in McCullough’s letter. Irish communism was struggling to survive, and 
it is questionable what impact, if any, would have derived from the CPGB Executive 
Committee resolution mooted by Cox. Certainly, it is debateable whether the CPGB was acting 
in its ‘ongoing capacity as the supervisor of the Irish Communists’ in 1958-59 (Treacy, 2012, 
p. 226). In any case, the CPGB faced its own difficulties. ‘1956 was the “annus horriblilis” of 
the British Communist Party’, which lost a third of its members after the Hungarian Rising and 
the fallout from the 20th congress of the CPSU (Eaden & Renton, 2002, p. 118). Arguably, this 
presented challenges for any return to the ‘practice’ of direct intervention which McCullough 
felt characterised the relationship between the parties ‘many years ago’.  Conversely these 
difficulties allowed the CPGB’s ‘Irish expert’, C.D. (Desmond) Greaves, more scope to 
influence the affairs of Irish communists in Britain and Ireland, especially as he championed 
the Connolly Association as a mechanism for ‘broad organisation’ on behalf of the Irish in 
Britain and against partition. 
The Connolly Association 1945-55
The prevailing historiography of the Connolly Association suggests that it was an ‘offshoot’ or 
front of the CPGB (Callaghan, 2003; Milotte, 1984; Treacy, 2012). This was certainly the view 
of the CA’s long-term political enemies, but one consistently countered by the Association 
itself and by commentators, usually former or existing members, who point to the CA’s non-
communist membership and constitution (Greaves, 78; Coughlan, 1989). Scholars of the CPGB 
(Morgan et al., 2007) have suggested that:
Within the CPGB the achievement of a degree of integration [by Irish emigrants] coupled with the 
recognition of a distinct Irish identity owed much to the establishment of the Connolly Association in 
1938. Providing a vehicle for socialist republicanism under communist direction, but without any 
suggestion of rivalry with established party structures, the association’s secretary and moving spirit was 
C. Desmond Greaves, later Connolly’s biographer (p. 201). 
This formulation, envisioning CA integration within British communism while leaving scope 
for distinction accurately describes the relationship. It also correctly identifies the key role 
played by Greaves. However, it is difficult to write about Greaves, the CA and its relationship 
with the communist parties in Britain and Ireland in the post-war era without seeing 
developments as resulting from the weak conditions for communist advance, factionalism and 
disagreements over basic positions. For some Irish CPGB members, the CA’s existence only 
served as a hindrance to the British party, and they certainly saw Greaves as a rival. Supporters 
of Greaves have suggested he was the ‘intellectual progenitor of the civil rights movement of 
the 1960s’ and that ‘it was he who pioneered the idea of a civil rights campaign to undermine 
Ulster Unionism’ (Coughlan, 1989, p. 8). However, the genesis of civil rights as a communist 
tactic cannot be understood solely in these terms. Rather than the brainchild of a radical 
intellectual, the civil rights approach emerged from shifting perspectives and collective debate, 
some of it acrimonious, amongst CA members and communists in Britain and Ireland 
throughout the 1950s. 
Formed on 4 September 1938 at the Engineers’ Hall, Doughty Street, Bloomsbury, the 
CA represented a coming together of the London Branch of the Republican Congress, the Irish 
section of the League Against Imperialism and former members of the Irish Self-Determination 
League (Coughlan, 1989).  They were soon joined by Irish International Brigadiers returning 
from the Civil War in Spain.  Indeed, the safe return of Frank Ryan, then in a Francoist prison, 
represented an early CA campaign (Greaves, 1978). Other campaign issues quickly became 
apparent in the group’s journal Irish Freedom – subsequently the Irish Democrat.  In early 
1939, the paper robustly defended itself from charges of communism, highlighted 
discrimination against nationalists in Northern Ireland, refused to condemn outright the IRA 
(then engaged in a bombing campaign in Britain), and advocated Irish emigrant involvement 
the labour movement.
The Association’s attitude to the war largely reflected the CPGB’s fluctuating line, 
itself dependent on Soviet foreign policy, but ongoing southern Irish neutrality did complicate 
matter somewhat. Added to this was the reluctance of some members to stop viewing the 
conflict as ‘imperialist’ following the Nazi invasion of the USSR. For a brief period, this 
included Desmond Greaves who later admitted having held a ‘left-wing line’ against the war 
after June 1941 (Treacy, 2012, p. 142). In 1933, twenty-year-old Greaves joined the CPGB as 
a student activist in his native Liverpool. After moving to London, the CPGB increasingly 
viewed Greaves ‘as an expert on Irish affairs’.  During the war he became Chairman of the 
Connolly Club and a member of Irish Freedom’s editorial board.23  He recalled (Greaves, 1978) 
the CA adopting the ‘correct’ position on the war:
Of course what had happened was that the popular aspect that had always been in the war had come to 
predominate, and now the imperialist aspect, while still remaining, was secondary. We were all young 
and unversed in political thinking. More or less by trial and error we took the measure of things. We 
supported the war; we defended the right of Ireland to be neutral; we opposed the conscription of 
Irishmen; and we took up Irish people’s grievances (p. 14). 
 Yet, as the post-war era began to take shape, the Catholic and nationalist Anti-Partition 
League (APL) largely defined Irish emigrant politics rather than the socialist republican and 
pro-Soviet CA.  Established in 1945, the APL emerged in Ireland and in centres of Irish 
emigration across the world. With ninety branches in Britain, the APL also enjoyed support 
‘broadly across the mainstream political spectrum at home in Ireland’ (Delaney, 2007, p. 182).  
This was in stark contrast with the CA, which came under attack for its perceived communism 
by the Catholic Church, political parties and newspapers within Ireland, and by the APL in 
Britain (Delaney, 2007). The attacks partially resulted from the Irish Democrat’s pro-Soviet 
outlook when the CPGB’s critical support for the Labour government declined with the onset 
of the Cold War. As a CA pamphlet written by Greaves (1949) argued: ‘If the Republic of 
Ireland re-opened relations with the U.S.S.R., her diplomatic position would be enormously 
strengthened, her greater strength would compel concessions where at present none are given’ 
(p. 9). 
Nevertheless, the APL’s limited foray into British electoral politics in 1950 brought 
opportunities for the CA. Its four candidates, standing in three Scottish constituencies and in 
Lancashire, polled only 5,045 votes between them (Jackson, 1963, p. 127).  The APL failed to 
decide which British political party, if any, to support and remained divided on Irish party lines 
at a time when mass emigration was a contentious political issue in Ireland.  In the wake of the 
British election failure, and the passing of the 1949 Ireland Act, which consolidated the Union, 
some APL members demanded a move to the left in Britain through support for the Labour 
party and collaboration with the CA.  In fact, several key activists, notably around Manchester, 
openly joined the Connolly Association despite its pariah status.24  This worsened relations 
between the APL and the CA, whose platforms suffered physical attacks in the summer of 
1950. Greaves attributed the violence to fascist-leaning elements within the APL who 
employed Irish republicans to do their fighting.25  Undaunted, he remained convinced about 
the potential of Irish emigrants.
Greaves believed the Irish in Britain could be divided into ‘Old’, ‘New’ and ‘Recent’ 
immigrants. ‘Old’ referred to those who had migrated prior to 1924, when the USA’s 
immigration policies ‘diverted the stream of vigorous young Irish to Britain’. Narrowly 
nationalist in their politics, they ‘lived in the days of Sinn Fein’, and whilst knowing ‘no 
communism in Ireland and little labour’, they nevertheless formed the ‘backbone’ of Labour 
in many areas. The ‘Old’ were resolutely anti-communist and provided the APL in Britain with 
its strongest support because of ‘its linking of removal of partition with anti-Sovietism’. The 
‘New’ Irish who had emigrated after 1924 were 400,000 in number and of these the ‘Recent’, 
some 200,000 strong, had arrived since the war. The older ‘New’ Irish were also supporters of 
Labour; they had not remained ‘in Ireland long enough to become disillusioned with De Valera’ 
and had a ‘greater fear’ of communism than their ‘Recent’ compatriots. The ‘Recent’ were 
mainly young and, although happy to have escaped ‘the ubiquitous church’ and aware of de 
Valera’s failures, they nevertheless wanted to return home and visited Ireland frequently. This 
group were intensely ‘interested in Irish affairs’, ‘felt partition strongly’, but ‘economic 
security, [and] fear of unemployment’ represented greater concerns. Although largely Catholic, 
if not devout, the ‘Recent’ were prepared to support communism ‘from a distance’.26 
These views probably did accurately reflect disillusionment with the established 
political parties in southern Ireland.  Delaney has noted that the APL’s ‘campaign to right the 
perceived wrong of partition’ was ‘spearheaded’ in Ireland by the ‘same Irish politicians who 
were widely blamed for presiding over dismal conditions at home that forced thousands to 
leave’(Delaney, 2007, p. 186).  Certainly, the CA recognised the progressive potential of the 
Labour-voting Irish in Britain, and the ‘Recent’ in particular, and viewed co-operation with 
nationalists and republicans as the means to channel this constituency from the faltering APL 
towards socialism: 
The Connolly Association… has grown rapidly in London during the past six months of crisis in the anti-
partition League. Its policy is to secure the widest possible unity in the struggle for Irish independence, 
rallying within its own ranks all those who support the teachings of James Connolly whether members 
of the Communist Party, the Labour Party or no party. In practice about half of its members are 
Communists…27 
In fact, until 1952, mutual hostility still marked the relationship between the APL leadership 
and the CA. Indeed, the APL attempted to expel members of the CA throughout 1951, whilst 
the Irish Democrat spearheaded the ‘fight’ to prevent this.28  
However, in January 1952 the Irish Democrat sounded a different note, by asking ‘Why 
do the Irish organisations in Britain which stand for an undivided Ireland not pull together to 
bring nearer their common object? Are the differences in outlook and policy so extreme?’29 In 
a tentative offer of détente, the editorial also offered Sinn Féin and the APL column inches in 
to express their opinions.30 What it did not say was that the Political Committee of the CPGB 
had a role in the speculative change in line and that it stemmed from criticism of Greaves’ 
intransigence: 
Following criticisms the P.C. laid down general line for special approach to the Irish in Augumn (sic) 
1951. This was to be through broad organisation of C.A. and Irish Democrat… The 1955 Constitution 
of the CA on which the Party was consulted summarizes the approach.31 
In 1951, Jim Prendergast, an influential CPGB and CA figure, contrasted the straight-
forward, anti-partition and anti-imperialism of CPGB stalwart, William Gallagher, who ‘never 
allows himself to be side-tracked into harmful speculation or comment on the contemporary 
problems of internal Irish politics’, with Greaves’ and the Irish Democrat’s line since 1947. 
This downplayed British imperialism, viewed partition as an ‘internal’ Irish problem and did 
not distinguish the Ulster Unionist Party leader, Basil Brooke, from the anti-partitionist 
champion of Irish neutrality, Éamon De Valera. This thinking had ‘damaged us in Irish circles 
in Lancashire’ whilst demonstrating ‘a lack of confidence in the forces working in Ireland’.32 
In short, Greaves complicated the straightforward anti-imperialism that appealed to the Irish in 
Britain whilst elbowing in on issues in the CP and IWL domain. As well as being ‘political’, 
Prendergast’s argument was almost certainly influenced by personal tensions. Intelligence 
documents reveal that in 1946, Greaves ‘had not a very high opinion of the more prominent 
(Irish) Communists, and they held an equally poor opinion of him’. This ill feeling lasted into 
the 1950s and Greaves’ unpopularity amongst Irish comrades preventing him from becoming 
the full-time paid editor of the Irish Democrat (Treacy, 2012, p. 212).  In one sense, Greaves 
and his opponents in the CA were in a state of denial about the true extent of their marginality 
amongst Irish immigrants whilst arguing amongst themselves how best to overcome their 
frequently self-imposed isolation. 
For some Irish communists in Britain, however, the CA’s very existence represented a 
hindrance. In 1953 Patrick O’Neill, a founding member of the IWL, who joined the CPGB after 
emigrating in 1950, rejected completely the idea of working through the CA. Instead, O’Neill 
wanted the CPGB to work directly with Irish emigrants. Likewise, Brian Behan, a recent 
emigrant from Dublin, who would rise rapidly in the ranks of the CPGB, rejected ‘the 
conception of being based politically in Britain’. In other words, Irish communists in Britain 
should work under the auspices of the IWL rather than the CPGB, and certainly not the CA. 
By 1954, he had retreated somewhat to argue that the CA should be a ‘socialist educational 
body, counter posing socialist to anti-imperialist tasks’.33  This factionalism assumed more 
‘dangerous forms’ as some Irish CPGB members argued for the setting up of an IWL branch 
in London. Subsequent attempts to arrange ‘socials’  and to ‘make a drive’ selling the Irish 
Workers’ Voice as opposed to the Irish Democrat in areas were the CA was already established, 
led to fights outside public houses.34 
 Greaves repeatedly portrayed this opposition as ‘ultra-left’ attempts to get the CA 
merely to ‘portray socialism in green paint, to be a transmission belt for the Irish emigrants 
into British left-wing organisations’.35 Behan’s subsequent involvement with the Trotskyist 
Socialist Labour League undoubtedly reinforced this view. Nevertheless, there are significant 
problems with Greaves’ post hoc counterpoising of ‘ultra-leftism’ with his characterisation of 
the CA as an ‘independent organisation of the Irish and their friends in Britain’ or that  
‘preaching socialism was none of it business’ (Prince, 2009, p. 90) especially given his own 
Cold War attitudes and the CA’s questionable independence. Greaves undoubtedly owed his 
dominance in the CA to his exalted position in the CPGB’s International Department. This in 
itself fuelled hostility, especially if one credits Behan’s (1991) acerbic portrayal: 
Small and English-looking he yet headed the Irish committee of the Communist Party. He got this post 
mainly because, like all small men, he wanted power, no matter how strange a figure he cut at St. Patrick’s 
Night dances, clad in his kilt and great Celtic brooch. He became more Irish than the Irish themselves (p. 
99).
 Despite continuing opposition, Greaves evidently concluded that he was the man to 
consolidate the CA’s new ‘broad organisation’ strategy.  
Towards Civil Rights 1955-62
The 1955 CA constitution did not mention the CPGB, and stated that it would not affiliate to 
or accept affiliation from political parties.  It also limited its goal to a thirty-two-county 
Republic, as opposed to a united socialist Ireland. Furthermore, the Association would not 
operate in Ireland, as its work lay in Britain, especially amongst the labour movement for the 
unity of British and Irish workers.36  Above all, the constitution signalled a coherent political 
strategy, which combined immediate activity aimed at undermining Ulster Unionism, with the 
long-term goal of undermining support for partition in Britain. Greaves’ biography of Connolly 
(1961) outlined the theoretical underpinnings: 
The issue of national independence (political and economic) is the crux of Irish politics. If, as was 
Connolly’s mature and considered opinion, the national revolution takes precedence, then the working 
class is not the only revolutionary class… It can expect allies, even if some of them are temporary… A 
further allied question was that of relations between the British and Irish labour movements. This he 
answered by advocating complete independence bridged by fraternal interchange (p. 428). 
The ‘broad organisation’ strategy was based on a stages framework: ‘We believe that 
Ireland will one day be socialist with institutions of a form appropriate to Irish requirements. 
But we can see no road to that except through national independence and would welcome any 
suggestions for debating this question in our columns’.37  This owed a significant debt to 
broader CPGB thinking on colonialism, which supported national liberation struggles in the 
Third World. In 1947, Palme Dutt had argued that in colonies which lacked a developed 
national movement ‘the first step should be the fight for democratic and civil rights, which 
would facilitate the development of such a movement… as part of the general struggle towards 
independence’ (Adi, 1995, p. 179). 
 Following the constitution’s adoption, the Irish Democrat became increasingly upbeat. 
There was a clear focus in relation to work with emigrants: ‘first their own defence, second the 
freedom of their country’.38 The former should not be underestimated when “No Irish need 
apply” was reported to be ‘back in the Midlands’.39  In relation to the second, the British labour 
movement was increasingly courted to ‘enlist the services of British Democracy in the struggle 
for Irish freedom’.40  Moreover, whilst communist-orientated sectarianism, particularly in 
relation to the Labour Party – ‘Labour imperialism’ – and the APL did not dissipate entirely, 
the Irish Democrat was cautious not to inflame anti-communist feeling. It notably did not dwell 
on the Hungarian revolution in 1956. Events were primarily viewed through the prism of the 
reaction they invoked in Dublin, where the IWL’s bookshop was attacked: 
There is no need to remark that opinion is overwhelmingly against Russia, and nearly as overwhelmingly 
against the Kadar Government… We can only wait and see – and in the meantime Ireland the country of 
our birth deserves just a little of her sons’ time and attention. 41
 In other words, the ‘broad organisation’ policy marked the final shift away from the tendency 
of the CA, through Greaves, to publically view Ireland through a Cold War lens.  The CPGB 
regarded the changed policy as a success, as by April 1955, the majority ‘of the Connolly 
Association membership are non-Party members and the proportion is increasing as the 
organisation sheds the sectarianism which has hampered its work in the past.’42 A (1957) diary 
entry by the devout Catholic, Dónal MacAmlaigh, one of the ‘Recent’, supports this 
assessment:
This is a socialist paper [Irish Democrat] put out by the Connolly Clubs. Many of the Irish here are 
against the people responsible for the paper as they are inclined to be very much to the left but I think 
they’re an honest enough bunch who are seriously concerned about the bad state that Ireland is in. It’s 
said that they are Communists but I doubt that. Only a short while ago, I was talking to a priest who told 
me that the English Communists had failed to get any good out of them at all (p. 112). 
The onset of the IRA’s ‘border campaign’ in December 1956 had a galvanising effect. 
The Association refused to condemn the IRA outright and, emphasised the structural, or 
imperialist, roots of the conflict while criticising of the Ulster Unionist Party’s authoritarian 
reaction, particularly in the sphere of civil liberties. This involved a number of showpiece 
campaigns. The first was the ‘Mallon and Talbot campaign’, which successfully exposed the 
use of force by the Royal Ulster Constabulary to extract false confessions from two Catholic 
youths sent to trial for murdering a police officer. This ‘had quite an impact on the Labour 
movement’ and was extended into attacking the Unionist Party’s internment of suspected 
republicans (Greaves, 1978, p. 29). The second campaign focused on the workings of the 1949 
Government of Ireland Act, specifically on how this prevented British MPs from discussing 
discriminatory practices in Northern Ireland: 
It is felt that the central point to work at is that the refusal of the British Home Sec. to answer questions 
re Northern Ireland is unconstitutional. Hostettler has carefully examined all the Acts of Parliament and 
says this is his firm view. Therefore, to get a big lobby early in March on this question (placing in the 
forefront the actual, at present existing denials of democracy in the six counties) would open up the 
possibilities of further agitation around the whole question of N.I.43
Ultimately these campaigns gained the attention and support of several Labour MPs.  However, 
the apparent successes heralded by ‘broad organisation’ were not immediately or universally 
appreciated. To many, rapprochement with republicans appeared incompatible with the theory 
and image of the CPGB, and with that party’s relationship with the Irish in Britain. 
In July 1958, Greaves wrote an exposé of ‘the twelfth [of July]’ in Northern Ireland 
counterpoised with the maltreatment of republican internees in Belfast’s Crumlin Road jail: 
‘The Tory-Unionists thus dress themselves in the garb of the landlord king who created a new 
aristocracy by the robbery of Catholic lands. The nationalists see themselves in the more 
sympathetic dress of the Fenian emancipators, in whom Marx detected more than a hint of 
socialism.’44 George Thompson, a CPGB member from Birmingham, rebuked Greaves for 
claiming that the IRA was anti-imperialist and therefore progressive, rather its ‘terrorist 
activities’ merely antagonised ‘the protestant majority’ thereby strengthening the Unionist 
Government. He further claimed that Greaves’ ‘line’ was ‘equally unacceptable’ to the CP and 
IWL.45  The CPGB responded that Greaves’ article represented a ‘historical treatment’ rather 
than a ‘Party Pronouncement’ and that a public discourse on the IRA would be unwise as the 
CP and IWL ‘are engaged in joint discussion with a view to preparing, if possible, a joint 
document on their views on the Irish Nationalist question and the tactics of the movement in 
Ireland’.46  Greaves was in fact a participant in these discussions. 47  Of course, as noted above, 
the ‘joint document’ of the IWL and the CP proved elusive.
In October 1958, the CPGB’s Political Committee CA’s strategy refused to support a 
pronouncement Greaves had prepared in relation to the Mallon and Talbot campaign.  This 
asserted, ‘the British Labour movement should press for the withdrawal of British troops from 
Northern Ireland, for as long as those troops are there, the British people are implicated in the 
government of that territory’.48  The Political Committee elected ‘after very careful thought, 
that it would not be wise for the Party, to take the step you suggest and get ourselves committed 
to a statement of the kind proposed’.49  Unfortunately, no explanation was provided for the 
decision, although it was possibly also due to the aforementioned discussions between the CP 
and the IWL, and ongoing debates about a ‘United Ireland’ in the context of the IRA’s ongoing 
border campaign. 
However, other critics within the CA were less circumspect during a crisis in the 
Association in late 1958. The divisions around whether the CA should operate as a ‘broad 
organisation’ or as a London Irish branch of the CPGB and Greaves’ alleged ‘dictatorial’ 
leadership style finally came to a head.  The serious dispute led to the suspension of thirty-five 
members following a brawl at an Association ‘social’.  Greaves’ most bitter opponents made 
unsubstantiated allegations that he had embezzled profits from the Irish Democrat.  In 
response, his supporters railed against ‘questionable party elements and Trotskyists’.50  
However, opposition extended beyond the personal or ‘ultra-leftist’. Some members clearly 
had genuine concerns about the CA’s pronounced nationalism, notwithstanding the more 
radical demands for British withdrawal from Northern Ireland. In November 1958, Joe 
Deighan, the CA’s President (and a supporter of Greaves), recalled a conversation with a fellow 
London CPGB and CA member: ‘the CA leaders do not understand the meaning of socialism 
and the party role. Their tricolour flag, Mallon and Talbot campaigns etc. are a nuisance which 
complicates the work of our Ahernes in the Unions’.51 Nevertheless, the momentum had swung 
too far in favour of Greaves’ approach for a policy reversal.
Senior CPGB figures effectively resolved the crisis with by reinstating Greaves’ 
opponents if they accepted that the CA represented ‘a broad non-Party organisation for all the 
Irish in Britain in the common fight.’52  The border campaign had brought pressures as well as 
opportunities for Greaves and his allies, but the CPGB leadership’s support was logical given 
the CA was increasingly at ‘the centre of connections between the Northern Irish opposition 
groups and the British Labour movement’ (Prince, 2007, p. 90). Moreover, the CP and IWL 
had apparently moved closer to Greaves in terms of attitudes towards republicans as the IRA’s 
militarist campaign faltered and thinking turned to potential alliances after the inevitable 
denouement.  The CP’s 1960 Congress called for an alliance ‘between the anti-imperialist 
patriotic forces and the forces of social progress’ whilst the IWL called for ‘more recognition 
of positive action against imperialism’ (Treacy, 2012, p. 283). In September 1961, the CPGB 
effectively approved these developments when it reversed previous policy and passed a 
resolution demanding the withdrawal of British troops from Ireland.53
Growing momentum in Britain led to Anthony Coughlan’s employment as a full-time 
CA organiser, and in 1961-62, he orchestrated a campaign based on marches across Britain to 
highlight conditions in Northern Ireland under Unionism (Greaves, 1978). In retrospect, these 
campaigns can be seen as a seed of the campaign for civil rights in Northern Ireland. A similar 
claim can be made about Greaves leading a delegation to see the Labour M.P., and Shadow 
Home Secretary, Patrick Gordon Walker, in June 1961. This resulted in a promise to facilitate 
a parliamentary debate around ‘the question of civil rights under Stormont’ (Prince, 2007, p. 
94).  In 1960, Roy Johnston, then an IWL member, moved to London and joined the CA.  Both 
Coughlan and Johnston were influenced by Greaves’ thinking in the early 1960s before 
returning to Dublin, where they would, in turn, exert influence over leading republicans.  
However, the Connolly Association also successfully affiliated to the National Council for 
Civil Liberties (NCCL), which ‘had a parliamentary group, supported by MPs from the three 
main parties at Westminster’ (Redmond, 2010, p. 6).  This would help bring the benefits of 
‘broad organisation’ to Ireland prior to the return of the CA luminaries. 
In 1962, three British Labour MPs travelled to Northern Ireland under the auspices of 
the NCCL to investigate allegations of discrimination. They met with representatives from a 
number of organisations including the IRA, the Belfast branch of the NCCL and workers from 
Harland and Wolff and Shorts.54  Prior to the delegation travelling, Greaves met  leading CP 
figures with ‘a proposal that investigators should go to the six counties’, and,  following the 
‘highly successful’ event, he wholesomely  praised  Belfast communists: 
Desmond would like to emphasise that the co-operation of the Party in the Northern Ireland was really 
first-rate. They gave the matter their most serious attention and did everything possible to help. Martin 
Ennals from the National Council of Civil Liberties had been there just prior to this delegation and rather 
queered the pitch by his approach to people. The Party helped to overcome this difficulty by spending 
considerable time working out how to approach different people to be seen, in what order they would be 
seen, etc... 55
The CP’s support of the NCCL delegation represented a tangible success and marked the 
genesis of the party’s involvement in a civil rights strategy. Indeed, the concept of ‘broad 
organisation’ became increasingly relevant in Ireland from this period onwards as evidenced 
in  the programmatic statements published by Ireland’s two communist parties in 1962. Both 
programmes Ireland’s Path to Socialism (CP) and Ireland Her Own (IWL) clearly resolved to 
work with all ‘progressive’ political forces in Ireland, including the republican movement.56 
This strategic shift had important ramifications for the development and character of 
subsequent civil rights agitations.  And, if not the long-awaited single programme on Ireland 
desired by the CPGB, Greaves certainly believed a breakthrough had been made.  In December 
1962 he wrote to Idris Cox, head of the CPGB’s International Department: ‘I should see you 
at the Jan and March meetings, but am bound to be a bit irregular as I have several jobs which 
necessitate spending a bit of time in Ireland. The revival of the movement is so marked that 
I’m beginning to wish I was a few years younger; Isn’t it a divil?’57  
Somewhat ironically, Greaves had fomented this state of affairs by taking advantage of 
his own esteemed position in the CPGB, to argue that it should relinquish the role of its own 
Irish membership over its approach to the ‘Irish Question’, and instead make the CA the 
channel. A 1964 CPGB document relating to ‘the work of the Irish Committee’ vindicated 
‘broad organisation’ on the basis of its effectiveness. A breakdown of the sales of the Irish 
Democrat contrasting overall sales with those via the CPGB proved this: 
Sometimes we hear the complaint that the broad organisation gives only ‘indirect access’ to the Irish in 
Britain, and that what is wanted is “direct access”…  the broad movement disposes of 7,500 copies of its 
journal each month. Of these Central Books distributes only 330 in Britain, though 117 others go to 
Australia. In London the District literature [committee] sells only 38 as against 36 in Manchester, 30 in 
Birmingham and 20 in Oxford. Yet throughout London there must be factory and other branches which 
are in contact with thousands of Irish people. The distribution of the journal of the broad movement is 
an immediate means of “direct access”. Are there other means?’ 58  
By this juncture, any remaining opposition to Greaves within the CPGB or the CA had been 
side-lined.   
Conclusion
Relations between British and Irish communists were generally good in the decade following 
the Second World War. The CPGB did not dictate policy or intervene to the extent that marked 
the Comintern era. Instead, the British party provided political, organisational and ideological 
encouragement and in return expected to act as the guarantor of the international communist 
line in Ireland. Arguably, this militated against the development of an indigenous united 
approach to the ‘National Question’. Although promising initiatives were pursued in towards 
an all-Ireland communist programme, notably the formation of the IWL-CP Joint Council, 
complementing the CPGB’s broader anti-imperialist discourses, the British party’s intermittent 
interest arguably fed Irish procrastination.  Indeed, although all sides recognised its importance, 
an all-Ireland programme failed to materialise. Instead, the IWL and CP published two 
respective programmes and not until 1962. In the interim the international context lowered an 
already peripheral Ireland in the CPGB’s list of priorities. Conversely, this provided the space 
for Desmond Greaves to assume a central role in the ‘movement’s’ development.  
Nevertheless, the CA’s largely communist composition and inclination, despite public 
disavowal, and the Irish Democrat’s pro-Soviet orientation undoubtedly played a role in what 
Coughlan (1989)  has described as the CA’s inability to ‘adapt to post-war circumstances and 
the advent of the Cold War’.  In this regard, Greaves was initially more rigid than those who 
shared the outlook of Jim Prendergast. However, if ‘broad organisation’ had its origins in 
criticism of Greaves’ Cold War posturing, he accepted and then championed the change in line, 
which, capitalising on the APL’s failure to make a lasting impression, became enshrined in the 
CA’s 1955 constitution. Thereafter it was under Greaves’ guidance that the CA became a 
formidable pressure group, which increasingly developed its own agency in relation to Irish 
affairs against the backdrop of the IRA’s ‘border campaign’ despite internal CPGB and CA 
opposition. The Association’s leadership would, however, remain dominated by communists 
and Greaves was indebted both to CPGB thinkers, notably Dutt, and the hierarchy for inspiring 
and acceding to his willingness to focus on Northern Ireland.
 This allowed the ‘movement’ to claim its part in the emergence of the civil rights 
agitation in Northern Ireland, as the ideas enshrined in ‘broad organisation’ helped encourage 
the CP into thinking in terms of civil rights. It was no accident that Betty Sinclair, leading CP 
member and confident of Greaves, became the first chair of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights 
Association. Moreover, the participation of two Connolly Association graduates, Roy Johnston 
and Anthony Coughlan, in the Wolfe Tone Society, formed 1964, heralded a further extension 
to Ireland, of the Connolly Association’s ‘broad organisation’ strategy. It too, would prove 
instrumental in the subsequent emergence of the civil rights movement. 
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